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Ever since the term was coined over 40 years ago,1 the "fruit of the
poisonous tree" doctrine has mandated the suppression of evidence de-
rived from an illegal search or seizure.2 The doctrine applies not only
to physical evidence, but also to intangible evidence such as informa-
tion or statements.3
Recently, the Supreme Courts of California and the United States
have been faced with a relatively new issue: should the doctrine re-
quire the suppression of an in-court identification of the defendant by a
witness to the crime because a prior illegal search or seizure associates
the defendant with the crime?4 In People v. Teresinski,5 the California
Supreme Court voted 4-3 in favor of suppression. One month later,
however, the United States Supreme Court unanimously approved
such an identification in United States v. Crews.6
The ultimate disposition of Teresinski is uncertain because the Peo-
ple's petition for certiorari was granted by the United States Supreme
Court; the judgment was vacated and the case remanded for further
consideration in light of Crews.7 On its face, the Crews holding would
seem to overrule Teresinski on fourth amendment grounds.' Yet there
are certain factual variations between the cases that make a distinction
possible.9 Additionally, the lead opinion in Crews presents a holding
1. See Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338, 341 (1939).
2. See Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385, 392 (1920).
3. United States v. Crews, 445 U.S. 463, 470 (1980).
4. The factual scenarios in the in-court identification cases can be complex, but for the pur-
pose of illustration can be reduced to the following: a crime is committed and witnessed by the
victim and perhaps others; through an illegal search or seizure the defendant is produced for the
witness to v-.ew, a positive identification is then made and later repeated in court.
5. 26 Cal. 3d 457, 605 P.2d 874, 162 Cal. Rptr. 44 (1980), vacated sub norn. California v.
Teresinski, - U.S. -, 101 S. Ct. 311 (1980).
6. 445 U.S. 463 (1980).
7. California v. Teresinski, - U.S. -, 101 S. Ct. 311 (1980).
8. This comment will not consider the possibility of Teresinski being upheld on "independ-
ent state grounds." Cf. Kaplan v. Superior Court, 6 Cal. 3d 150, 161, 491 P.2d 1, 8, 98 Cal. Rptr.
649, 656 (1971); People v. Martin, 45 Cal. 2d 755, 761, 290 P.2d 855, 857 (1955) (establishing the
independent California rule permitting third party standing to invoke the exclusionary rule).
9. See text accompanying notes 212-217 infra.
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supported by only three votes.' 0 Five concurring Justices appear will-
ing to extend the holding to admit in-court identifications even when
the defendant's presence was procured through an illegal search or
seizure." The California Supreme Court must carefully review the
various opinions in Crews because a different result could be suggested
by each.
There are also two lines of cases on in-court identifications that are
affected by the holdings of Crews and Teresinski. Prior California deci-
sions established the so-called "happenstance" rule,'2 which is difficult
to reconcile with Teresinski. '3 Another line of cases requires the sup-
pression of evidence obtained through official misconduct intentionally
pursued for the purpose of obtaining that evidence."' The status of
these decisions can be clarified by a decision in Teresinski on remand if
thorough consideration is given to the important factors underlying the
exclusionary rule.
The purpose of this comment is threefold. First, because the analyti-
cal framework used by courts when applying the exclusionary rule is
somewhat less than clear, it is necessary to develop a comprehensive
approach detailing the factors and policies inherent in the application
of the rule. A recognition of these factors will serve to clarify the ratio-
nales and holdings of the in-court identification cases. Second, since
Crews is the only decision by the United States Supreme Court directly
on point, the lead and concurring opinions in that case must be ana-
lyzed to determine the continuing validity of Teresinski and other prior
decisions. Third, this comment will suggest potential results in Teresin-
ski on remand, and how the next decision by the California Supreme
Court can clarify the state of the law on this issue. Finally, this com-
ment will conclude that since the causal connection between an in-
court identification and a prior illegal search or seizure is weak, while
the costs of exclusion are usually high, such identifications should be
suppressed only when the effect would be to deter purposeful violations
of the Constitution by police.
10. See 445 U.S. at 464 (only Stewart and Stevens, JJ., fully joined the lead opinion of Bren-
nan, J.; Marshall, J., did not participate).
I1. See.Id
12. The "happenstance" rule permits the introduction of unlawfully obtained evidence if po-
lice inadvertently "happen" onto it in the course of investigating a different crime. See text ac-
companying notes 119-134 infra.
13. See text accompanying notes 204-209 infra.
14. See text accompanying notes 135-148 infra.
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ANALYSIS OF THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE
A. Constitutional Origins
Unlike the fifth amendment, the fourth amendment contains no pro-
vision expressly prohibiting the use of evidence obtained in violation of
its guarantees.' 5 To introduce an improperly obtained inculpatory
statement of the defendant would make him a witness against himself.
But to introduce unlawfully seized evidence would not itself violate the
right of a person to be secure in his house or effects. 6 By reading these
two constitutional guarantees together, however, the Supreme Court
first applied the exclusionary rule to enforce the provisions of the
fourth amendment. 7 This integration is reasonable since both amend-
ments are designed essentially to protect aspects of the broader right to
privacy.'8 Moreover, the exclusionary remedy is necessary to insure
that the guarantees of the fourth amendment are meaningful.' 9
At least three justifications for the exclusionary rule have been ad-
vanced. One theory, the redress of fourth amendment violations
against individuals, has been rejected persistently.20 By the time the
exclusionary rule is applied, it is too late to repair "the ruptured pri-
vacy of the victims' homes and effects. ... 21 The rule acts prospec-
tively, not retrospectively.22
Another justification for the exclusionary rule has been relegated to a
limited status. This theory, the maintenance of judicial integrity, was
recognized in the Mapp decision as stemming from a desire to en-
courage respect for the law. 23 Courts should not admit evidence ob-
tained in violation of the law.24 Later decisions have recognized that to
take the rationale of judicial integrity to its logical limit would mandate
the exclusion of all illegally seized evidence in all proceedings.25 Such
an application of the exclusionary rule would eliminate the standing
requirement that restricts invocation of the rule to only those whose
15. See U.S. CONsT., amend. IV, amend. V.
16. See W. RINGLE, SEARCHES AND SEIZURES, ARRESTS AND CONFESSIONS 1-16 (2d ed.
1979) [hereinafter cited as RINGLE]. See generally Pitler, "The Fruit of the Poisonous Tree" Revis-
ited and Shepardized, 56 CALIF. L. REv. 579, 620 (1968) (citations omitted).
17. See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 646 (1961). For 47 years after its adoption the exclu-
sionary rule was applied solely by federal courts. But in Mapp the Court recognized the need for
an adequate safeguard of fourth amendment rights and consequently applied the exclusionary
rule to the states through the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. See id at 652-55.
18. See id at 646.48.
19. Id at 655-56.
20. See Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 486 (1976); United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338,
347 (1974); Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 217 (1960).
21. Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 637 (1965).
22. See 364 U.S. at 217.
23. See 367 U.S. at 659.
24. See id
25. See 428 U.S. at 485-86.
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rights have been violated directly.26 Additionally, such exclusion also
would contradict the public policy of admitting any highly probative
evidence.27
Deterrence of illegal police conduct is the most compelling rationale
for the exclusionary rule.28 The Mapp Court indicated that suppression
of the ill-gotten evidence is the most effective means of eliminating un-
lawful searches and seizures by authorities.29 As the Court once said,
the exclusionary rule removes "the incentive to disregard'! the constitu-
tional guarantees by suppressing the fruit of a violation.30 Whatever
the effectiveness of the rule for this purpose, the Court has made it clear
that this is the operative justification for the rule t.3
Therefore, the exclusionary rule is premised primarily on the need to
deter official misconduct, and to a lesser extent on the importance of
maintaining judicial integrity. We now turn to a discussion of the evi-
dence that should be excluded and the circumstances under which it
should be excluded to attain these goals.
B. "Truit of the Poisonous Tree"
The exclusionary rule not only operates to suppress evidence ob-
tained directly from an illegal search or seizure, but also evidence that
is obtained indirectly from such a violation.32 For example, if docu-
ments are illegally seized and the knowledge gained from them is used
to obtain further evidence, the latter evidence will have been obtained
from the former.33 Under the "fruit of the poisonous tree" doctrine
such derivative evidence is tainted by the prior illegal seizure and thus
is inadmissible.3
To determine what evidence is the "poisonous fruit" of official mis-
conduct, it is necessary to begin with the standard set forth in Wong
Sun v. United States.3" In that landmark case the Court articulated the
controlling test:
We need not hold that all evidence is "fruit of the poisonous tree"
simply because it would not have come to light but for the illegal
actions of the police. Rather, the more apt question in such a case is
"whether, granting establishment of the primary illegality, the evi-
26. See id at 485.
27. See id
28. See id at 486; United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 347 (1974).
29. See 367 U.S. at 656.
30. See Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 217 (1960).
31. See generally 428 U.S. at 492.
32. RINGL., supra note 16, at 3-4.
33. See Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385, 390-92 (1920).
34. See Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338, 341 (1939).
35. 371 U.S. 471 (1963).
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dence to which instant objection is made has been come at by ex-
ploitation of that illegality or instead by means sufficiently
distinguishable to be purged of the primary taint."36
Although a "but-for" test was rejected by Wong Sun as the sole basis
of analysis, the illegality must still be at least a cause-in-fact of the
procurement of the derivative evidence to warrant exclusion.37 Once
that step is met, the Wong Sun "exploitation" standard also must be
satisfied to suppress the evidence. 38 The Supreme Court has not given
this standard a concrete definition and apparently a number of factors
are involved in identifying "exploitation."
C. Interpreting the Exploitation Standard
L The Importance of Effective Deterrence
Recent Supreme Court decisions indicate that a highly significant
factor of the exploitation standard is the extent to which exclusion will
effectively deter future police misconduct. 39 For example, some cases
indicate that when technically unlawful police conduct is pursued in
good faith, exclusion is not required. In Michigan v. Tucker,4" police
interrogated the defendant without first fully informing him of his Mi-
randa4 rights.4 2 Since Miranda was not yet decided, the police had
done all that the law required of them at the time.4 3 But the defendant
sought to apply the Miranda rule retroactively so that the testimony of
a witness disclosed during the interrogation could be suppressed.44
Initially, the Tucker Court pointed out that the law "cannot realisti-
cally require that policemen investigating serious crimes make no error
whatsoever." 45 Turning to the specific facts before it, the Court con-
cluded:
The deterrent purpose of the exclusionary rule necessarily assumes
that police have engaged in willful, or at the very least, negligent
conduct which has deprived the defendant of some right ....
Where the official action was pursued in complete good faith, how-
ever, the deterrence rationale loses much of its force.46
36. Id at 487-88, citing J. MAGUIRE, EVIDENCE OF GUILT 221 (1959) (emphasis added).
37. See Ruffin, Out OnA Limb Of The Poisonous Tree: The Tainted Witness, 15 U.C.L.A.L.
REv. 32, 38 (1967).
38. See text accompanying note 36 supra.
39. See United States v. Ceccolini, 435 U.S. 268, 274-75 (1978); United States v. Calandra,
414 U.S 338, 347-48 (1974).
40. 417 U.S. 433 (1974).
41. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
42. 417 U.S. at 436.
43. Id at 447.
44. Id at 437.
45. Id at 446.
46. Id at 447.
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The official misconduct in Tucker was minor because police simply
neglected to inform the defendant that counsel would be provided for
him if he could not afford one.47 Further, there was no evidence to
indicate that Tucker's statement informing police of the witness was
involuntary.48 Tucker therefore may signify that exclusion is not war-
ranted when the official misconduct is minor and suppression will have
little deterrent effect.49
When litigants seek expanded application of the exclusionary rule to
proceedings other than criminal trials, the Court has also cited the lack
of deterrent effect as a reason for limiting the application of the rule.-"
Frequently in these situations, the Court will also balance the potential
gain in deterrent effect against the long-term costs of more extensively
excluding evidence."
This approach has resulted in the decision that the exclusionary rule
may not be invoked before a grand jury. 2 The Court felt that police
would be motivated to uphold the constitutional guarantee by virtue of
the fact that the evidence would still be suppressed at trial. 3 Addition-
ally, the Court feared that the traditional inquisitorial role of the grand
jury would be hindered by excluding relevant evidence from its consid-
eration 4
Application of the exclusionary rule to some civil litigation also has
been denied. In United States v. Janis,55 Los Angeles police seized cer-
tain evidence of bookmaking activity including $4,940 in cash. When
the Internal Revenue Service learned of the money, it assessed wager-
ing excise taxes on Janis and levied on the seized funds. But during the
criminal prosecution the Court determined that the evidence had been
seized unlawfully and all items were ordered returned except the
money. Consequently, Janis brought suit for a refund and the I.R.S.
counterclaimed for the unpaid tax. In determining whether the ille-
gally seized evidence could be used against the plaintiff, the Court
weighed the cost of exclusion against the gain in deterrent effect. 6 The
Court concluded that state police would be deterred from misconduct
even if the evidence is used by another sovereign in a civil proceed-
47. See id at 436.
48. See id at 445.
49. Cf United States v. Peltier, 422 U.S. 531 (1975) (issue and holding analogous to Tucker).
50. See notes 52-61 and accompanying text infra.
51. See notes 78-88 and accompanying text infra.
52. See United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 351-52 (1974).
53. See id at 351.
54. See id at 349.
55. 428 U.S. 433 (1976).
56. See id at 453-54.
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ing.57
Finally, in Stone v. Powell,58 the Court denied federal habeas corpus
relief for alleged fourth amendment violations when the defendant had
been given a full and fair hearing of his claim in state court.59 Justice
Powell observed in his majority opinion that suppression would not
effectively deter official misconduct unless police believed that federal
review would uncover illegal procedures that otherwise would go unde-
tected in state proceedings. This possibility was considered "dubi-
ous."6 Thus finding that benefits to be derived from habeas corpus
review of fourth amendment cases were minimal, whereas costs were
high, the Court denied such a remedy in virtually all state search and
seizure cases.6'
2. The Degree of Causation
Another important consideration in deciding whether to suppress ev-
idence apparently the fruit of illegal police conduct is the directness
and certainty of the causal connection between the official misconduct
and the procurement of the derivative evidence. The illegal search or
seizure must significantly steer authorities to the derivative evidence.6"
The Court in Brown v. Illinois63 delineated two factors that are rele-
vant:64 (1) the temporal proximity between the misconduct and deriva-
tive evidence, and (2) the presence or absence of intervening
circumstances. These factors were utilized by the Brown Court in sup-
pressing a confession obtained just two hours after an illegal arrest with
no significant intervening circumstances.65
A further illustration of these factors can be found in the facts of
Wong Sun v. United States.66 A series of arrests and leads directed
federal narcotics agents to the defendant Wong Sun.67 He was arrested
and released, but he later returned for questioning by the agents.6" A
written statement, that the defendant refused to sign, was prepared
from the interrogation.69 The prosecution attempted to introduce this
57. See id at 454.
58. 428 U.S. 465 (1976).
59. See id at 494.
60. See id at 493-94.
61. See id at 494-95.
62. United States v. Cales, 493 F.2d 1215, 1215-16 (9th Cir. 1974).
63. 422 U.S. 590 (1975).
64. Id at 603. A third factor, "the purpose and flagrancy of the official misconduct," was
also listed. But this factor seems to be a consideration of whether suppression would further the
deterrence. See RINGLE, supra note 16, at 3-22.
65. See 422 U.S. at 604.
66. 371 U.S. 471 (1963).
67. Id at 473-75.
68. Id at 475-76.
69. Id at 476-77.
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statement at trial.70 Although the defendant's arrest was held invalid
for want of probable cause,7' the Supreme Court declined to suppress
the statement as a poisonous fruit.72 The facts leading to this conclu-
sion were that a period of several days had elapsed, a lawful arraign-
ment intervened betwen the arrest and interrogation, and the defendant
had returned voluntarily to make the statement.73 Thus, the length of
elapsed time and the intervening circumstances purged the taint of the
illegal arrest.74
If oral evidence is sought to be suppressed, the directness of the
causal connection becomes especially critical. The Supreme Court has
held that "a closer, more direct link between the illegality" and live-
witness testimony is required to suppress this type of evidence.75 A
particularly relevant factor in this analysis is the "willingness of the
witness to testify freely."'76 This requirement of a more direct line of
causation for live-witness testimony is due to the fact that the cost of its
exclusion, possibly silencing the witness permanently, is particularly
great.77
3. Balancing the Costs of Exclusion
Detractors of the exclusionary rule78 may not have succeeded in
overturning it yet, but they may be making some progress. Recent de-
cisions seem to be adding the cost of exclusion as another factor in
exploitation analysis.79 The policies behind the rule must be balanced
against these competing costs before the rule is applied. 0
One general competing policy that has found consistent expression is
the need to make all relevant and trustworthy information available.8 '
The "evidence sought to be excluded is typically reliable and often the
most probative information bearing on the guilt or innocence of the
defendant."8 2 In a system of justice designed to seek the truth, this is
an especially high cost.
70. Id at 477.




75. United States v. Ceccolini, 435 U.S. 268, 278 (1978).
76. Id at 276.
77. See id at 277-78.
78. See, e.g., Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, n.27 (1976); RINGLE, supra note 16, at 1-18
(listing some detracting authorities).
79. See 435 U.S. at 275-76; 428 U.S. at 488; United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 348-49
(1974). See also Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 450 (1974).
80. See 428 U.S. at 488.
81. See 435 U.S. at 278, citing Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 450 (1974). See generally
428 U.S. at 490. See also Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 688 (1972).
82. 428 U.S. at 490.
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The exclusionary remedy also may have the ultimate effect of dis-
couraging one of its own goals: maintaining the integrity of the judicial
system.8 3 Guilty persons may be freed by the suppression of critical
evidence8" and the disparity between the police misconduct and the
windfall to the defendant can be particularly great.8 5 Therefore, "if
applied indiscriminately, [the exclusionary rule] may well have the op-
posite effect of generating disrespect for the law and administration of
justice. '8 6
When oral evidence is sought to be suppressed, it is essential to bal-
ance the costs of exclusion against the goals of the exclusionary rule.
Exclusion of live-witness testimony is especially costly because it may
"perpetually disable a witness from testifying about relevant and mate-
rial facts, regardless of how unrelated such testimony might be to the
purpose of the originally illegal search or the evidence discovered
thereby.'87  Typical tangible evidence can be obtained by several
means, but the only way to have a witness testify about his or her own
knowledge is to have the witness speak before the court. Therefore,
such an exclusion can seriously impede the fact-finding process and the
evolution in the law of evidence is away from such impediments. 88
D. Exceptions to the Exclusionary Rule
There are three commonly accepted exceptions to the exclusionary
rule: attenuation, independent source, and inevitable discovery.89
Since any one of these exceptions potentially could be applied to in-
court identifications, some brief description of each is warranted.
The attenuation exception operates to admit evidence remotely de-
rived from a prior illegality.9° Upon a showing that the causal connec-
tion between the prior official misconduct and discovery of derivative
evidence is weak, the evidence may be admitted because the connection
has "become so attenuated as to dissipate the taint."91 Although some
degree of causation exists, it is not significant enough to warrant exclu-
sion of the evidence.92
Even though evidence was once obtained unlawfully, it still may be
83. See text accompanying notes 23-27 supra.
84. 428 U.S. at 490.
85. Id
86. Id
87. 435 U.S. at 277.
88. See id, citing C. McCoRMICK, THE LAW OF EVIDENCE 150 (1st ed. 1954).
89. United States v. Crews, 445 U.S. 463, 470 (1980).
90. It involves the same considerations as the degree of causal connection factor of exploita-
tion analysis. See text accompanying notes 62-77 supra.
91. See Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338, 341 (1939).
92. See RINGLE, supra note 16, at 3-22. See text accompanying notes 103-109 infra for an
application of the exception.
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admitted under the independent source exception if it is rediscovered
through means independent of the original misconduct.93 Application
of the exception serves a dual function. First, the initial exclusion will
serve to deter illegal police conduct. Second, the evidence does not re-
main forever inaccessible to the fact-finder since it still may be admit-
ted if discovered through legal means.94
The controversial inevitable discovery exception operates to admit
evidence that eventually would have been discovered properly even
though it had previously been seized illegally. The prosecution must
establish that, through a legitimate standard investigatory procedure
with predictable results, the evidence would have been discovered.95 In
effect, the inevitable discovery exception is a "hypothetical independent
source" theory.96
Neither the United States Supreme Court 9 7 nor the California
Supreme Court98 has expressly approved the inevitable discovery ex-
ception. The exception has been criticized as failing to promote the
deterrence rationale of the exclusionary rule. 99 If police know before-
hand that the fruits of an illegal search or seizure may be admissible,
they have little incentive to conform their activities to the constitutional
standard. Therefore, while the possible use of the inevitable discovery
exception should be recognized,"00 further discussion of the exception
herein seems unwarranted until it is given greater acceptance.
Operating as it does, to prevent the use of any tainted evidence, the
exclusionary rule has perhaps its most dramatic impact when applied to
testimonial evidence, particularly when the testimony is an in-court
identification of the defendant by the victim or another witness. The
93. See RINGLE, supra note 16, at 3-22.
94. See Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S 385, 392 (1920). See notes 110-
115 and accompanying text infra for an application of the independent source exception to an
identification issue.
95. See Comment, The Inevitable Discovery Exception to the Exclusionary Rule, 74 COLUM.
L. REv. 88, 93 (1974).
96. RINGLE, supra note 16, at 3-14.
97. See Fitzpatrick v. New York, 414 U.S. 1050 (1973) (White, J., dissenting from denial of
certiorari).
98. But see People v. Superior Court (Tunch), 80 Cal. App. 3d 665, 674-75, 145 Cal. Rptr.
795, 799-800 (1978) (interpreting some cases to have impliedly adopted the exception).
99. See 80 Cal. App. 3d at 681, 145 Cal. Rptr. at 804; Comment, The Inevitable Discovery
Exception to the Exclusionary Rule 74 COLUM. L. REy. 88, 99 (1974).
100. See Commonwealth v. Garvin, 448 Pa. 258, 293 A.2d 33 (1972) (the court employed the
inevitable discovery exception to admit in-court identifications obtained after the defendant was
illegally arrested).
The illegal arrest in this instance merely provided the means for the confrontation with
[the witness] more promptly than would otherwise have been the case. . . . We cannot
assume that but for the illegal arrest the appellant would have remained at large indefi-
nitely.
Id at 266, 293 A.2d at 37-38 (footnotes omitted).
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significant cases where the rule has been applied to such testimony will
fiow be examined.
THE ELEMENTS OF IN-COURT IDENTIFICATIONS
In Crews, Justice Brennan identified three elements of in-court iden-
tifications: (1) the presence of the witness in the courtroom; (2) the
ability of the witness to base the identification upon the mnemonic rep-
resentation he or she formed of the defendant at the time of the crimi-
nal act itself; and (3) the presence of the defendant in the courtroom.' 0 '
If any of these elements is supplied by an illegal search or seizure, the
in-court identification might be suppressed. 0 2
United States v. Ceccolini13 illustrates a possible tainting of the first
element of in-court testimony. In that case an illegal search revealed
evidence of unlawful gambling and a witness who had knowledge of
the crime. 1"4 Four months later investigators interviewed the witness
and her testimony led to the defendant's indictment for perjury.0 5
Therefore, the discovery of the witness and her subsequent testimony
were products of the prior unlawful police actions.
The Ceccolini Court permitted the witness's testimony in spite of its
connection to the prior illegal search1°6 The Court concluded that the
presence of intervening circumstances attenuated the connection and
purged the taint from the testimony.' 7 These circumstances included
the length of time between the search and court appearance and the
willingness of the witness to testify freely.' 08 The Ceccolini result indi-
cates that the attenuation exception has ready applicability to the first
aspect of in-court identification. 0 9
The second element of in-court identifications requires that the wit-
ness's substantive testimony not be tainted by any official miscon-
duct. 0 This may be an issue if the defendant is identified at a pre-trial
lineup that is either conducted unconstitutionally or while the defend-
ant is in illegal custody. For instance, in Crews the Court had to deter-
mine whether the witness's memory of the assailant was affected by
101. United States v. Crews, 445 U.S. 463, 471 (1980).
102. See id (a majority holding indicating that if either of the first two elements is come at by
exploitation, then the identification will be suppressed). There is dispute as to the third element.
See text accompanying notes 167-177 infra.
103. 435 U.S. 268 (1978).
104. Id at 270-72.
105. Id at 272.
106. Id at 279.
107. See id
108. See generally id
109. See 47 U. CIN. L. Rav. 487, 492 (1978).
110. See United States v. Crews, 445 U.S. 463, 472 (1980).
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intervening photographic and in-person lineups."' The witness's testi-
mony will be inadmissible if it is tainted by the illegal police acts." 
2
In United States v. Wade," 3 the Court enumerated certain factors to
be employed in assessing whether the witness's recollection is based on
the incident itself or has been affected by intervening illegal acts. These
factors include prior opportunities to observe the accused, any failures
to identify the accused, any discrepancies in descriptions given, and the
lapse of time between the incident and the courtroom identification."
4
If it satisfies the Wade test, the prosecution has in effect met the in-
dependent source test by showing the witness's memory to be rooted so
strongly in the incident itself that it is unaffected by intervening fac-
tors.1
1 5
Neither of the first two aspects of in-court identifications is tainted in
any of the four major cases discussed hereafter. In each instance the
witness (usually the victim) came forward voluntarily to report the inci-
dent and describe the perpetrator before any illegal search or seizure
occurred. 6 In addition, there is no indication that the witness's recol-
lection was affected by an intervening lineup identification that ren-
dered the in-court testimony inadmissible." 7 Instead, it is the third
element (the presence of the defendant in the courtroom) that is the
issue in each case. It was an illegal search or seizure in virtually each
case that led to the defendant's discovery and subsequent court appear-
ance.1 8 Had it not been for this appearance, the witness could not
have made the identification by pointing out the defendant for the fact-
finder to see. All of the relevant cases turn on this issue.
In analyzing the decisions discussing in-court identifications made
after an illegal search or seizure, there are two lines of cases, the "hap-
penstance" and "roundup" cases, that establish the outer parameters of
admissibility. These cases serve to frame the issue of this comment and
are a good beginning point for discussion. Then the impact of Crews
can better be assessed, and some of the possible future dispositions of
Teresinski can be discussed.
111. See id at 473.
112. See id
113. 388 U.S. 218 (1967).
114. See id at 241.
115. See 445 U.S. at 473 n.18.
116. See generally 445 U.S. at 471-73; United States v. Edmons, 432 F.2d 577, 581 (2d Cir.
1970); People v. Teresinski, 26 Cal. 3d 457, 461, 605 P.2d 874, 875, 162 Cal. Rptr. 44, 46 (1980),
vacatedsub nom California v. Teresinski, - U.S. -, 101 S. Ct. 311 (1980); Lockridge v. Superior
Court, 3 Cal. 3d 166, 170, 474 P.2d 683, 686, 89 Cal. Rptr. 731, 734 (1970).
117. See generally id
118. See text accompanying notes 120-123 (Lockridge), 136-141 (Edmons), 153-162 (Crews),
184-194 (Teresinski) infra.
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THE OUTER PARAMETERS OF THE IN-COURT
IDENTIFICATION CASES
A4. The Happenstance Cases
The first California cases to discuss the admissibility of in-court
identifications that had been derived from an illegal search or seizure
established the so-called "happenstance" rule. In Lockridge v. Superior
Court" '9 the Los Angeles police found a gun belonging to the defend-
ant while conducting a warranted search for the investigation of an-
other crime. 2 ' A serial number on the gun led police to the report of a
robbery in Lennox that had occurred two years before.' 2 ' The suspects'
photographs were then shown to the victims of the robbery, who identi-
fied the defendants as their assailants. 22 The warrant later was de-
clared invalid. 2
The California Supreme Court denied the defendant's petition for a
writ to compel the trial court to suppress the identifications.'24 Citing
Wong Sun, the court said that the testimony was not arrived at via an
exploitation of the illegality.'25 The Los Angeles investigation was not
aimed at finding new witnesses, nor did it gain any further evidence
since the identity of the victims was already known to the police.'
26
Since the discovery of a lead for one crime during the investigation of
another was "pure happenstance,"' 27 suppression of the identifications
would not further the deterrence rationale of the exclusionary rule.'
28
Two years after Lockridge, the remarkably similar case of People v.
McInnis12 9 was decided. The court again found that the discovery of
evidence of one crime during the investigation of another was pure
happenstance. 30 The decision emphasized that suppression of the vic-
tim's identification testimony would give "a crime insurance policy in
perpetuity to all persons once illegally arrested."' 3' Thus, the costs to
119. 3 Cal. 3d 166, 474 P.2d 683, 89 Cal. Rptr. 731 (1970).




124. Id at 171, 474 P.2d at 686, 89 Cal. Rptr. at 734.
125. See id at 169-70, 474 P.2d at 685-86, 89 Cal. Rptr. at 733-34.
126. See id at 171, 474 P.2d at 686, 89 Cal. Rptr. at 734.
127. See id
128. See id
129. 6 Cal. 3d 821, 494 P.2d 690, 100 Cal. Rptr. 618 (1972). Shortly after a robbery in
Pasadena, the victim and another witness were shown several hundred photographs, but were
unable to make an identification. One month later, Los Angeles police arrested the defendant on
an illegal weapons charge and photographed him. When this latter photo was shown to the two
witnesses they identified the defendant as the robber. However, the arrest was held to be unlaw-
ful. Id at 823-24, 494 P.2d at 690-91, 100 Cal. Rptr. at 618-19.
130. See id at 825, 494 P.2d at 692, 100 Cal. Rptr. at 620.
131. See id at 826, 494 P.2d at 693, 100 Cal. Rptr. at 621.
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society of excluding such evidence were considered by the court as well
as the effect of suppression on the deterrence rationale.
32
While the holdings in Lockridge and McInnis indicate that the hap-
penstance discovery of unsought evidence does not satisfy the exploita-
tion standard, the reasoning behind this conclusion is somewhat
unclear. In many ways, the decisions seem to be employing the attenu-
ation exception because there are indications that the time lapse be-
tween the search or seizure and the later testimony is so great that the
taint of the prior illegality has become attenuated.133 It seems more
likely that the Lockridge-Mclnnis rule is a tacit recognition of the im-
portance of satisfying the deterrence rationale. 134 When police do not
originally seek the questioned evidence, but merely "happen" onto it,
there is no purposefulness in their misconduct. Since they cannot pre-
dict when they will happen onto evidence again, exclusion is unlikely
to deter them from such conduct.
B. The Roundup Cases
A very different situation from the Lockridge type case is presented
when evidence has been obtained through official misconduct inten-
tionally pursued for the purpose of obtaining that evidence. In United
States v. Edmons135 between 50 and 60 agents of the Federal Bureau of
Investigation were sent to a neighborhood in New York City for the
purpose of arresting a group of persons who allegedly had interfered
with the arrest of one Oliver the day before.' 36 The agents were told
that anyone who had been part of the group could be arrested for fail-
ure to have a draft card, yet the only description they were given was
that the suspects were "young and black."' 37 Five persons were ar-
rested on this basis, even though some said their draft cards were avail-
able in their homes nearby. 138 After the defendants were brought to
police headquarters they were presented to three of the four agents who
had been hampered in the performance of their duty the previous
day.139 The fourth agent identified some of the defendants at their ar-
132. The "happenstance" rule has been followed by lower California courts. See People v.
Griffin, 59 Cal. App. 3d 532, 537-38, 130 Cal. Rptr. 648, 651 (1976); People v. Fitzgerald, 29 Cal.
App. 3d 296, 314, 105 Cal. Rptr. 458,469 (1972); Williams v. Superior Court, 25 Cal. App. 3d 409,
412-13, 101 Cal. Rptr. 91, 93 (1972).
133. See 6 Cal. 3d at 826, 494 P.2d at 693, 100 Cal. Rptr. at 621; 3 Cal. 3d at 170, 474 P.2d at
686, 89 Cal. Rptr. at 734.
134. See 60 CALIF. L. REv. 870, 877-78 (1972).
135. 432 F.2d 577 (2d Cir. 1970).
136. See id at 580.
137. Id
138. Id at 580-81.
139. Id at 581.
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raignment on the morning after their arrest. 4 These arrests were held
illegal and the defendants then sought to suppress the agents' identifi-
cations as tainted by the unlawful arrests.14
Two significant points emerge from the appellate opinion in Edmons:
(1) that the illegal arrests were a prime ingredient of the in-court identi-
fications; 42 and (2) that the deterrent purpose of the exclusionary rule
would be well-served by suppression. 43 Indeed, the court concluded:
We are not obliged here to hold that when an arrest made in good
faith turns out to have been illegal because of lack of probable cause,
an identification resulting from the consequent custody must inevita-
bly be excluded. But in a case like this, where flagrantly illegal ar-
rests were made for the precise purpose of securing identifications
that would not otherwise have been obtained, nothing less than bar-
ring any use of them can adequately serve the deterrent purpose of
the exclusionary rule.'"
The Supreme Court's decision in Davis v. Mississippi145 lends support
to the Edmons holding. In Davis fingerprint exemplars were sup-
pressed because they were derived from a roundup of over twenty sus-
pects fitting only a general description of the assailant. 46 The Court
held that such a procedure did not comply with the fourth amend-
ment.147
Unlike the happenstance cases, invocation of the exclusionary rule in
the roundup cases is necessary to secure compliance with fourth
amendment standards. As the Court said in Davis: "Nothing is more
clear than that the Fourth Amendment was meant to prevent wholesale
intrusions upon the personal security of our citizenry .... ,,14s The de-
terrence of future instances of official misconduct intentionally pursued
for the purpose of obtaining that evidence can best be accomplished by
suppressing the fruits of that misconduct.
UNITED STATES V CPMEws
Since Crews 149 is the only Supreme Court decision directly on point,
140. Id
141. Id
142. See id at 583.
143. See id at 584.
144. Id (footnotes omitted).
145. 394 U.S. 721 (1969).
146. The victim was raped by someone she could only describe as a young, black male. Ac-
cordingly, police combed the town and brought over 20 such persons to headquarters for finger-
printing. Id at 721-22.
147. See id at 728. One author has opined that the Davis holding requires the suppression of
identifications obtained after an unlawful arrest of the defendant. Quinn, In The Wake of Wade:
The Dimensions Of The Eyewitness Idenftcatian Cases, 42 U. CoLo. L. REv. 135, 155 (1970).
148. 394 U.S. at 726.
149. 445 U.S. 463 (1980).
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it has a profound impact upon all of the relevant cases, as well as upon
Teresinski. But it is an especially difficult case to interpret because it
leaves many questions unresolved.
The prosecution of the defendant in Crews stemmed from three rob-
bery incidents. 5 ° Between the third and sixth of January in 1974 three
women were accosted and robbed in a restroom on the grounds of the
Washington Monument.151 The modus operandi in each incident was
substantially similar and the descriptions of the assailant given to po-
lice by each victim matched. 52 On January 9, Officer Rayfield of the
United States Park Police observed Crews in the area of the crimes and
realized that he fit the descriptions given by the robbery victims.I5 3
Rayfield and his partner stopped the defendant who told them his
name and age (16). 154 Crews was allowed to leave and while he was in
a restroom the officers located James Dickens, who believed he had
spotted the assailant on January 3. 155 Dickens observed the defendant
leaving the restroom and identified him as the person he had seen at
the time of the incident.' 56
Crews was taken into custody as a suspected truant and photo-
graphed although he never was formally charged with an offense.1 57
He was then identified by the robbery victims both from the photo-
graph and in a lineup.'58 The District of Columbia Superior Court
ruled the station house detention on the truancy charge illegal for lack
of probable cause.159 Consequently the photographic and lineup iden-
tifications were suppressed.' 60 The court, however, admitted the vic-
tims' in-court identifications, and the defendant was convicted of
robbery.' 6 1 This ruling was reversed by the District of Columbia Court
of Appeals which suppressed all identification evidence.' 62
The Supreme Court granted certiorari and reversed the Court of Ap-
peals.' 63 In his lead opinion Justice Brennan progressively examined
each of the three elements of in-court identifications.l'4 For each of the
first two aspects, he concluded that no issues were presented by the
150. Id at 465.
151. 'Yd
152. Id at 465-66.




157. Id at 467.
158. Id
159. Id at 467-68.
160. Id at 468.
161. Id
162. Crews v. United States, 389 A.2d 277 (D.C. 1978).
163. 445 U.S. at 470.
164. Id at 471-75.
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case. 165 But when considering whether the defendant's courtroom pres-
ence was a poisonous fruit of the illegal detention, Brennan subdivided
his analysis into two parts. First, he dismissed the claim that the de-
fendant himself could be a tainted fruit of the illegal detention by citing
a line of cases holding that a prior illegal arrest is not itself a bar to
subsequent prosecution. 66 In the second subdivision of his opinion,
Brennan dealt with the argument that the defendant's corpus could it-
self be considered tainted evidence because the witness's act of pointing
out the defendant is a critical ingredient of the in-court identifica-
tion.167 Brennan found it unnecessary to decide this latter issue. 68 In-
stead, he noted that the authorities had had reason to suspect Crews
before the illegal detention occurred. 169 Thus, they did not derive the
impression or appearance of the defendant from the detention, since it
was already known to them.170 The only benefit gained from the un-
lawful detention was the "link" of the witnesses' memory of the de-
fendant with the appearance of the accused. 17 1 This link was of no
evidentiary value, so that there was no "fruit" of the illegal act to sup-
press. 172 In this latter part of his opinion, Brennan was supported by
only three votes. 173
In contrast to Brennan's skirting the corpus-as-evidence question,
five concurring Justices felt that the issue could be answered readily. 17
Justice White considered the manner in which the defendant's presence
was procured to be irrelevant. 175 Since an illegal arrest would not by
itself bar a subsequent trial, the presence of the defendant for purposes
of identification "is merely the inevitable result of the trial being
held."' 176 Suppressing the defendant's corpus also would "effectively
[insulate] one from conviction for any crime where an in-court identifi-
cation is essential."' 177
If Justice Brennan's opinion is accepted as authoritative, the admissi-
bility of an in-court identification procured after an illegal search or
165. id at 471-73.
166. See id at 474.
167. See id This latter argument must be distinguished from the earlier contention by de-
fendant that there should be no prosecution because his presence was illegally procured. The
defendant's alternative argument is that the illegal arrest revealed his appearance to police and,
therefore, his corpus should be suppressed as a poisoned fruit.





173. See id at 479 (White, J., concurring).
174. See id
175. See id at 478.
176. Id
177. Id
Pactflc Law Journal / Vol 12
seizure will remain an unsettled issue. Because if authorities were una-
ware of the defendant's appearance before the illegal arrest, his corpus
could be considered the tainted fruit of that illegality. An identification
would be impossible if the defendant's corpus was suppressed.
On the other hand, if Justice White's view is considered controlling,
then an in-court identification seemingly would be admissible in any
instance when the courtroom presence and recollection of the witness
were not the products of unconstitutional police acts. 178 One question
that then arises is whether this view is intended to be so extensive as to
include even identifications obtained by unconstitutional dragnet pro-
cedures 179 pursued for the precise purpose of securing the identifica-
tions. The broadness of White's opinion would seem to require their
admission. Such a literal reading of his opinion ignores the more com-
pelling consideration of the need to deter police misconduct, and is
therefore unlikely.
The Crews decision thus raises as many questions as it answers. A
future case will have to clarify whether the view of Justice Brennan or
that of Justice White is authoritative and under what circumstances it is
to be applied. Resolving these questions will go a long way towards
determining the validity of uncertain cases like Teresinski.
PEOPLE V TEp ESINSKI'
80
In the early morning of December 3, 1976 three men robbed a
Seven-Eleven store in Woodland, California, taking about $70.1t 1 Mr.
Cady, the store clerk at the time of the incident, gave a description of
the robbers to police when they arrived shortly thereafter."8 2 A witness
who had been outside the store gave a description of the car used in the
robbery.1 3
A short time later, Officer Rocha of the Dixon Police stopped an
unfamiliar vehicle in Dixon because he believed that at least two of the
three occupants were juveniles and in violation of the local curfew. 84
Before they pulled to a stop, Rocha saw the driver and front-seat pas-
senger glance back at him while reaching down.'85 At this point Rocha
178. See id (White indicates that the identification of Crews should not be suppressed since
the victims' own presence and recollection were untainted).
179. See text accompanying notes 135-148 supra.
180. 26 Cal. 3d 457, 605 P.2d 874, 162 Cal. Rptr. 44 (1980), vacated sub noma. California v.
Teresinski, - U.S.--, 101 S. Ct. 311 (1980).
181. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 8-10, California v. Teresinski, - U.S. -, 101 S. Ct. 311
(1980) [hereinafter cited as Petition].
182. Petition, supra note 181, at 15.
183. Petition, supra note 181, at 15.
184. 26 Cal. 3d at 460, 605 P.2d at 875, 162 Cal. Rptr. at 45.
185. Id
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suspected that the occupants had either alcohol or a weapon in the ve-
hicle.' 86 After ordering the driver and front-seat passenger out of the
car, Rocha discovered an open beer can and loaded revolver under the
front seat.' 87 Rocha then called for a backup unit and after it arrived
he searched the interior of the car finding a bag of marijuana and a
paper bag full of money.' 88 All three occupants were then arrested for
investigation of robbery. 8 9 Rocha was still unaware of the Woodland
robbery. 190
After the suspects were booked in Dixon, the money found in the car
was traced to the Seven-Eleven robbery."'9 The defendants were trans-
ported to Woodland a few hours after their arrest and photographed.192
Cady identified the defendants from the photographs and later in
court.' 93 The trial court, however, found the arrest to be unlawful and
suppressed Cady's identification testimony as a poisoned fruit.1 94
On appeal, the California Supreme Court affirmed the suppression
order.'9 5 Initially, the court devoted a lengthy portion of its opinion to
affirm that there was indeed no probable cause for stopping the vehi-
cle.' 96 Turning to the issue of whether the identifications should be
suppressed, the court cited the Wong Sun "exploitation" standard as
controlling. 9 7 The court concluded that to remove the taint from un-
lawfully obtained evidence requires "an intervening independent act
by the defendant or a third party."' 98 Finding no intervening act, the
court held that the identifications were tainted and therefore inadmissi-
ble. 9 9
In order to distinguish the happenstance cases, the Teresinski major-
ity concluded that those decisions were limited to cases involving in-
dependent police agencies investigating independent crimes °.2 ° These
were not the facts in Teresinski according to the majority.20' Under
these circumstances, the majority held the identification testimony to
186. Id
187. Id at 461, 605 P.2d at 875, 162 Cal. Rptr. at 45.
188. Petition, supra note 181, at 13-14.
189. Petition, supra note 181, at 14.
190. 26 Cal. 3d at 468, 605 P.2d at 880, 162 Cal. Rptr. at 50 (Manuel, J., dissenting).
191. Petition, supra note 181, at 12-14.
192. Petition, supra note 181, at 14.
193. 26 Cal. 3d at 461, 605 P.2d at 875, 162 Cal. Rptr. at 46.
194. Id
195. Id at 464, 605 P.2d at 878, 162 Cal. Rptr. at 48.
196. See id at 461-63, 605 P.2d at 875-77, 162 Cal. Rptr. at 46-47.
197. Id at 463, 605 P.2d at 877, 162 Cal. Rptr. at 47.
198. Id at 464, 605 P.2d at 877, 162 Cal. Rptr. at 47, citing People v. Sesslin, 68 Cal. 2d 418,
428, 439 P.2d 321, 328, 67 Cal. Rptr. 409, 416 (1968).
199. See 26 Cal. 3d at 464-65, 605 P.2d at 877-78, 162 Cal. Rptr. at 4748.
200. See id at 464-65, 605 P.2d at 877-78, 162 Cal. Rptr. at 48.
201. See id
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have been arrived at by exploitation of the illegal arrest.20 2
THE KEY ISSUES IN TERESINSKI ON REMAND
Now that the Teresinski judgment has been vacated and the case re-
manded for reconsideration in light of Crews,2"3 the perplexing identifi-
cation issue is raised in California once again. The California Supreme
Court now has the opportunity to clarify the law in this area in three
significant ways: (1) by distinguishing and explaining the rule in the
happenstance cases; (2) by giving Crews an interpretation that renders
it either distinguishable from the facts in Teresinski or controlling of
them; (3) by incorporating the considerations of the roundup cases as
an integral part of the analysis.
A4. Distinguishing The Happenstance Cases
Distinguishing the happenstance cases is perhaps the first issue that
should be addressed, because the majority's original resolution of the
matter was vague at best. A lower court may well have difficulty inter-
preting the decisions in light of the "independent agencies, independent
investigations" language in Teresinsk 2°4 Teresinski seems particularly
subject to the characterization of a happenstance case because the
Dixon and Woodland police departments can hardly be considered
anything but separate.20 5 The defendants were neither originally ar-
rested for the Woodland robbery, nor were the Dixon police ever inves-
tigating that incident.20 6
Perhaps the only realistic basis for distinguishing Teresinski from the
happenstance cases lies in the importance of deterring unconstitutional
police activity. If the stop in Teresinski was made solely to secure any
evidence of any unlawful activity on the part of the defendants, and the
alleged curfew violation was merely used as a pretense for the stop,20 7
then there is greater deterrent value in exclusion of the evidence. In
this sense, Teresinski is no longer a happenstance case since the police
were not really seeking evidence of a specific crime when they hap-
pened onto evidence of another. Instead, they were never really inves-
tigating anything specific, but sought any evidence of any crime. The
Teresinski result would therefore be compatible with the policy ration-
202. Id at 465, 605 P.2d at 878, 162 Cal. Rptr. at 48.
203. California v. Teresinski, - U.S. -, 101 S. Ct. 311 (1980).
204. See 26 Cal. 3d at 464-65, 605 P.2d at 877-78, 162 Cal. Rptr. at 48.
205. Woodland and Dixon are separated by approximately 16 miles in a relatively rural area
of northern California. The two towns are also in different counties (Yolo and Solano).
206. See 26 Cal. 3d at 468, 605 P.2d at 880, 162 Cal. Rptr. at 50 (Manuel, J., dissenting).
207. See text accompanying notes 214-216 infra for an interpretation of Teresinski as a roust
case.
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ale underlying the happenstance rule.2 °8
However, the Teresinski court really may have decided that the hap-
penstance rationale is no longer valid and that suppression is a neces-
sary remedy in all such cases to deter future instances of official
misconduct. Justice Tobriner, who wrote the Teresinski majority opin-
ion, also dissented in McInns 20 9 on policy grounds. The court may
therefore have switched to Tobriner's original view. If the court is
making a change in the law, it should say so openly instead of hiding
behind a meaningless distinction.
B. Applying Crews
When the California court interprets the Crews decision in the proc-
ess of reconsidering Teresinski, it is initially faced with a choice be-
tween the view of Justice Brennan and that of Justice White. If the
latter is followed, there seems little chance of suppressing the identifica-
tion because of the broadness of White's opinion. Apparently the de-
fendant's presence in court for purposes of identification is the only
allegedly tainted aspect of the identification process in Teresinski.2 10
Since White views the manner in which the defendant's person is pro-
cured to be irrelevant to his presence at trial,2 1 it would seem that the
identifications in Teresinski must be admitted.
But if Brennan's opinion is followed, this conclusion may not follow.
Brennan declined to decide whether the defendant's person could be
the unlawful fruit of an illegal arrest.2 12 In this light, Teresinski's per-
son could well be suppressible fruit because, unlike the case in
Crews,2" 3 he was unknowfi to police as a potential suspect before the
detention. It was the official misconduct that revealed his identity and
made him available for the identification. Accordingly, the identifica-
tion could be suppressed if Brennan's view is accepted, because the de-
fendant's person was procured illegally.
C. Incorporating The Roundup Rationale
The conflicts of Teresinski with the happenstance cases and Crews
can be overcome in yet another fashion. There is another possible in-
208. See note 134 and accompanying text supra.
209. See People v. McInnis, 6 Cal. 3d 821, 827, 494 P.2d 690, 693, 100 Cal. Rptr. 618, 621
(1972) (Tobriner, J., dissenting). See notes 129-132 and accompanying text supra for a discussion
of Mlnnis.
210. There is no mention in Teresinski that the witness's presence was illegally procured or
that his memory was impaired by the unlawful arrest of the defendant.
211. See United States v. Crews, 445 U.S. 463, 478 (1980) (White, J., concurring).
212. See id at 475.
213. Compare id with People v. Teresinski, 26 Cal. 3d 457, 464, 605 P.2d 874, 877, 162 Cal.
Rptr. 44, 47 (1980), vacatedsub not California v. Teresinski, - U.S. -, 101 S. Ct. 311 (1980).
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terpretation of the Teresinski facts that, by incorporating the rationale
of the roundup cases, 214 would require suppression of the identifica-
tions. Perhaps, in reality, Officer Rocha stopped the defendants' car
only because he thought they were carrying on some illegal activity.
He might have believed them to have liquor or illegal drugs in the pas-
senger compartment even though he had no specifically articulable
facts for his belief. In short, Rocha's detention of the defendants could
have been directly aimed at procuring evidence of illegal. activity with-
out the slightest bit of reasonable suspicion.
If such were the case, there would be a purpose and flagrancy to the
official misconduct not unlike the roundup cases. Unwarranted rousts
by police are unlawful and future instances of such misconduct can
best be deterred by suppression.2 15 Through this interpretation of Ter-
esinski the happenstance cases can be distinguished and the identifica-
tions can be suppressed unless White's view in Crews controls and
overrules Edmons.216 But if the roundup rationale is to be followed,
the court must cite to stronger facts that specifically demonstrate a lack
of any justification for stopping the vehicle and an intent to roust the
defendants on the part of Officer Rocha.
Therefore, one of two methods can be employed on remand to sal-
vage the original Teresinski result. On one hand, the court can choose
to follow the view of Justice Brennan in Crews and then distinguish
that case on the facts. The court would then have to decide the tough
question that Brennan left unanswered: whether the defendant's
corpus can be considered a fruit of the unlawful arrest.21 7 Alternatively
the court can characterize Teresinski as a roundup case and base sup-
pression on Edmons and the dicta in Davis.
CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS
The identification cases are acute examples of the competing goals
that can arise in fourth amendment cases. In deciding whether to ad-
mit an in-court identification after an illegal search or seizure, a court is
invariably faced with a policy choice. On the one hand suppression
may seriously impair the public policy of making all evidence available
in a case and frustrate the need to punish the guilty. Yet, admission of
the identification may permit a violation of constitutional rights to go
unchecked.
A proper exploitation analysis considers three competing factors: the
214. See text accompanying notes 135-148 supra.
215. See generally Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 16 (1968).
216. See note 179 and accompanying text supra.
217. See text accompanying notes 167-172 supra.
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need for deterrence, the degree of causal connection, and the costs of
exclusion. 1 8 In applying these considerations to the identification
cases, two factors remain relatively constant. First, the line of causa-
tion leading from the official misconduct to the subsequent in-court
identification is unbroken by significant intervening circumstances, but
is usually lengthy. Second, the costs of exclusion are generally high
since it is the victim's testimony that is sought to be suppressed. He
may be the only person capable of identifying his assailants.
The third factor of exploitation analysis, fulfillment of the deterrence
rationale, turns essentially on the motivations of the police when they
illegally search or seize the defendant. If they merely happen onto the
proffered evidence or have some significant degree of justification for
their actions, then suppression will have little deterrent effect. Police
cannot foretell when they will happen onto evidence again and they
may be reasonably mistaken as to what facts constitute the proper justi-
fication for a valid search or seizure.21 9
However, if the police secure evidence through official misconduct
intentionally pursued for the purpose of obtaining that evidence, sup-
pression will have deterrent value. The exclusionary remedy will
demonstrate that any criminal evidence police seek to gain through de-
liberate unconstitutional acts will be denied them. They will be moti-
vated to comply with the fourth amendment in securing the desired
evidence.
In light of these three considerations, suppression of in-court identifi-
cations should be granted only when it will result in the deterrence of
future police misconduct. Suppression of all in-court identifications se-
cured by an illegal search or seizure, even when there is no resulting
deterrent effect, would cause the exclusion of reliable evidence and pos-
sibly set a guilty person free. But this reasoning should not be taken to
the extreme of permitting even identifications obtained through official
misconduct intentionally pursued to secure that evidence. Approval of
identifications obtained in this manner would make a mockery of the
fourth amendment.
A balancing of the need for deterrence with the other two exploita-
tion factors can explain why an identification procured through a
roundup was suppressed in Edmons, u° while an identification obtained
by happenstance was admitted in Lockridge.uu' Yet in Teresinski, the
218. See text accompanying notes 39-88 supra.
219. See People v. Teresinski, 26 Cal. 3d 457, 463, 605 P.2d 874, 876-77, 162 Cal. Rptr. 44, 47
(1980), vacatedsub nom California v. Teresinski, - U.S. -, 101 S. Ct. 311 (1980) ('reasonable
mistake of law" argument).
220. See text accompanying notes 39-88 supra.
221. See text accompanying note 134 supra.
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court cited the exploitation language of Wong Sun as its standard for
determination222 but never gave consideration to the policies that are a
part of exploitation analysis. The majority's opinion smacks of the un-
acceptable "but for" test,223 for the court merely begins with the prem-
ise that the arrest was illegal and concludes that the identification was
tainted because the chain of events leading from the arrest was unbro-
ken.224
The United States Supreme Court has made it clear that mechanical
applications of the exclusionary rule are improper and any analysis
must consider the competing policies underlying the rule.2 25 By giving
consideration to the three factors, a court can adequately protect the
competing interests involved. Such an analysis also serves the equally
important function of providing a clear and logical body of case law on
a difficult issue.
Timothy P. Murphy
222. See 26 Cal. 3d at 463, 605 P.2d at 877, 162 Cal. Rptr. at 47.
223. See text accompanying note 36 supra.
224. See 26 Cal. 3d at 464, 605 P.2d at 877, 162 Cal. Rptr. at 47.
225. See United States v. Ceccolini, 435 U.S. 268,274 (1978) ("The issue cannot be decided on
the basis of causation in the logical sense alone, but necessarily includes other elements as well.").
